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ESSAYS
BANAL TIME: WAR AFTER GRAND NARRATIVE
GRAHAM MacPHEE
My heart sank. I thought: My God! [Kissinger is] in the same state 
of mind as the rest of them. . . . They each thought that history 
started with his administration and that they had nothing to learn 
from earlier ones. Yet in fact each administration . . . repeated the 
same patterns . . . without even knowing it.
—Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the 
Pentagon Papers (2002)
I
The very ubiquity of the POW/MIA flag across the United States makes 
it easy to miss.1 Flown over state and federal buildings, post offices, parks, 
toll plazas, military posts, and private homes, its image is echoed on pins, 
bumper stickers, car decals, license plates, bracelets, bandanas, T-shirts, 
caps, knives, and other consumer goods.2 Or perhaps it is more accurate to 
say that its ubiquity makes it easy to forget. Historically, the POW/MIA 
movement contributed to a new popular attitude to military involvement 
in Southeast Asia that allowed the Nixon presidency to extend the war in 
Vietnam and launch invasions into Cambodia and Laos (Franklin 1993, 
48). It helped foster this mood by enabling the dissipation of temporal 
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connection, the links between what had been done or gone before and the 
present of recognition. As Jonathan Schell observed as the war came to a 
close, “many people were persuaded that the United States was fighting in 
Vietnam in order to get its prisoners back. . . . Following [Nixon’s] lead, 
people began to speak as though the North Vietnamese had kidnapped 
four hundred Americans and the United States had gone to war to retrieve 
them” (1975, 76).
As various commentators have noted, the affective disposition signaled 
by the turn to the plight of prisoners of war dissolved the sense of temporal 
connection required by historical inquiry and the investigation of political 
responsibility.3 But what is so striking about Schell’s observation is that it 
suggests that the dissipation of history and causality enabled by this new 
disposition did not simply result in an ahistorical moment or perpetual 
present, a vertiginous loss of meaning and identity.4 Instead, the sense 
of loss, disorientation, and anger which it engendered intimates some 
kind of story—or perhaps better, intimates a hunch, a powerful but fuzzy 
sense of meaningfulness fleetingly intuited or half-glimpsed: that of the 
righteousness of the hurt and betrayal evoked by the “kidnapping” of 
hundreds of Americans by a foreign force, and the urgency of resentment 
against those who would deny the very fact of this feeling, its immediacy 
here and now in lived experience. I will argue that this new temporal 
nexus is not the atemporal disruption or suspension of narrative imagined 
by contemporary theory, but the banal time of endless war.5
The premise of this essay is that the banal time signaled by the 
affective disposition of “POW/MIA” exceeds the opposition between 
grand narrative and the disruption of the time of representation that 
has become axiomatic for contemporary theory.6 This banal temporality 
can be traced in the rhizomatic, lateral penetration of POW/MIA 
within everyday American culture, but it can also be observed in the 
conditions of apperception exhibited by the decision-making of practical 
intellectuals within the political and military bureaucracy. It is this dis- 
and re-articulation of temporality, I contend, that is recognized with such 
a jolt by Daniel Ellsberg on reading the entirety of the Pentagon Papers.7 
As Ellsberg recounts, what shocked him out of his own complicity in the 
planning and justification of the war in Southeast Asia was not the study’s 
detailing of the empirical evidence, the facts, of recent military operations: 
the later volumes of the study, he recalls, “held few surprises for me” (2002, 
274). Rather, it was the volumes covering 1945 to 1960, and especially those 
covering the immediate postwar period, that provoked his reconceptu-
alization of his own role in the bureaucracy and his ethical and political 
decision to leak the Pentagon Papers (256). What prompts Ellsberg into 
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action is not the revelation of a “secret” about the savagery or illegality 
of current operations, nor an insight into the extent and profundity of 
the suffering inflicted by US military power.8 It is rather the stunning 
realization delivered by the early volumes of the Pentagon study—that “it 
had all happened before” (2002, 300; emphasis added).9
To think through this banal time I turn not to a text that engages 
directly with the American war in Southeast Asia or the series of invasions, 
interventions, proxy wars, or covert operations that have followed in 
its wake, but to Christopher Nolan’s neo-noir movie Memento (2000). 
Through the experience of a protagonist who cannot form new long-term 
memories, Memento dramatizes the apperceptive condition described by 
Ellsberg, in which “the same patterns” are “repeated . . . without even 
knowing it” (2002, 347). As Greg Grandin demonstrates in his insightful 
recent study Kissinger’s Shadow, Henry Kissinger’s “imperial existentialism” 
rejects historical analysis as a disabling master narrative that locks agency 
in the prison house of determination. “Reporters and academics might have 
been obsessively digging up facts that proved the United States overthrew 
this democratic government or funded this repressive regime,” Grandin 
writes, but Kissinger “persevered in insisting that the past shouldn’t limit 
the country’s range for options in the future” (2015, 13). As Kissinger said 
himself: “In reaching a decision, [the statesman] must inevitably act on 
the basis of an intuition that is inherently unprovable. If he insists on 
certainty, he runs the danger of becoming a prisoner of events” (quoted in 
Grandin 2015, 32).
I argue here that Kissinger’s opposition—between a cumulative, 
deterministic temporality that makes decision “a prisoner of events” 
and “an intuition” unencumbered by temporal connectivity—finds a 
discomforting echo in the abstract opposition of master narrative and 
the temporality of disruption that has become so sedimented within 
contemporary theory that it functions as an almost unacknowledged 
structuring principle. In the terms of this assumption, the narrating of 
historical connectedness can only be construed as a totalizing violence; 
while conversely whatever disrupts, subverts, destabilizes, or resists 
such violent master narratives is in and of itself liberatory. Or as Homi 
Bhabha put it so succinctly, “freedom’s basis” is “in the indeterminate” 
(1991). But what if indeterminacy is also subject to determination, albeit 
in ways that it cannot recognize and towards outcomes it cannot chart, 
evaluate, or anticipate? And what if such unacknowledged determination 
can only be brought to appearance in the distortions and warps revealed 
in the temporal connectivity that we have already ruled out as ineluctably 
complicit with the violence of grand narrative? 10
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II
In The Deaths of Others, John Tirman catalogues how America’s declared 
wars of the postwar period have “led to the killing of an astonishing 
number of innocent people” (2011, 11). This assessment leads him to pose a 
series of guiding questions:
Why: why were civilians so badly mistreated? Why does this mistreatment 
persist under US political and military leadership? And why are Americans 
so indifferent to these massive human tragedies? (Tirman 2011, 6)
These questions may seem obvious (if by no means otiose), yet as Tirman 
notes their interrogation “has been missing from public discourse and 
academic studies alike.” “Most academic treatments of war,” he writes, 
“look at causes, behavior of states, military strategies, effects on other 
states, and the like.” And while “some interest in analyzing genocide is 
surfacing, . . . it has little to do with America” (7). Equally, he remarks 
that “the very topic of culpability for civilian deaths is essentially out of 
bounds in the echo chamber of Washington political discourse, and thus 
the idea that civilian casualties are unsettling to the American public 
and that the resultant outrage serves as a check on military behavior is 
nonsense” (13). In reference to the study he commissioned for the MIT 
Center for International Studies in 2006, which “found . . . 650,000 ‘excess 
deaths’ attributable to” the US invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, Tirman 
reports that “the public indifference was glaring, and in my view needs to 
be investigated in tandem with the indifference of policy elites” (10, 11). It 
“is not in dispute,” he avers, “that American elites and the broader public do 
not seem to care much about innocent bystanders in the wars we begin” (6).
As regards policy and practice, Tirman concludes that “there has 
been, in effect, a two-tiered system,” which presents “a policy that avows 
to uphold the Geneva Conventions” while simultaneously pursuing 
“an unacknowledged practice with priorities that frequently victimize 
civilians, people who are discardable because they are ‘gooks’ or ‘hajis’ or, 
simply, ‘savages’” (2011, 11). Significantly, however, while he is confident 
in his conclusions about the data and the clear disparity between policy 
and practice, Tirman is more cautious in answering the last of his guiding 
questions, as to “why . . . Americans [are] so indifferent to these massive 
human tragedies” (6). For answers he points to terrain that those of us who 
work in cultural history and critical theory will be more familiar with. 
Namely, that such indifference results in part from the organizational 
power within discourse of the master narratives of nation and imperial 
civilization and the ontologies or essentialisms they underpin: “the old 
tropes of the frontier [and] the civilizing mission of American force,” 
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in Tirman’s formulation (12). Under the determinative power of these 
narratives of presence, self-identity, and closure, “the topic of culpability for 
very large-scale civilian suffering is deflected by reference to the essential 
rightness of the war, its ultimate benefits to those very populations under 
siege, and the good intentions of Americans abroad” (8). But while these 
ontologies of certainty and essence are surely in play, Tirman cannot find 
in them a sufficient answer that will satisfy the affective “indifference, or 
diffidence” that is so striking to him. For the vista he surveys is not one 
where Enlightenment discourses of reason, or nation, or civilization—
with their universalizing claims to representation and narrative coherence 
based in the onto-theological—are paramount, even if they continue to 
fulfill a supporting role. Rather, what presents itself most insistently and 
urgently to Tirman’s view is “an absence of discourse,” an absence that is 
alternately “reinforced by or causative of public indifference” (12).
Given that the contribution of Enlightenment discourses of nation and 
civilization fails to fully account for the affective condition of “passive 
denial” that he identifies, Tirman points to the need for thinking a 
supplement or excess beyond the discursive parameters of master narrative. 
Such narratives are indeed involved to some extent, it is made clear (see 
2011, 344–54); but they cannot on their own provide an explanation or 
basis for analysis that would adequately grasp the specific character of 
this condition. Taking the terms “cultural” and “political” as synonyms 
for such grand narratives and as external to the processes of subjectivity 
(understood as the “psychological”), Tirman argues that “the denial is not 
merely cultural or political; it is psychological—avoidance of the trauma 
of so many dead, wounded, and displaced, and even reactions leading to 
blaming the victim” (12).
What seems especially valuable about Tirman’s analysis is its 
identification within this historical condition of “denial” and “blaming” 
of a dimension that goes beyond the master narratives of nation and 
civilization, “the old tropes of the frontier [and] the civilizing mission of 
American force” (2011, 12). And it is this element that I want to address 
here by turning to the banal time of POW/MIA. I do not, however, follow 
his sense of the easy separability of the “cultural” and “political” on the 
one hand and the “psychological” on the other. Indeed, the temporality of 
denial and blame that I identify here is deeply bound up with cultural and 
political histories that are not acknowledged or remembered.
As Steven Casey recounts, the POW/MIA issue emerged as a result 
of the Nixon administration’s “Go Public” campaign begun soon after 
the new president’s inauguration in 1969, a publicity initiative that 
was designed to “marshal public opinion” against the domestic antiwar 
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movement. The administration “wanted a positive rallying cry to energize 
[its] base,” and “the issue of American POWs seemed ideal” (2014, 197). In 
light of election promises to pursue “the quest for peace” (Franklin 1993, 
45), Nixon sought to justify the expansion of the war in Southeast Asia 
“by emphasizing that the United States would fight until every prisoner 
was returned” (Casey 2014, 197). H. Bruce Franklin argues that the crucial 
step in retooling an ostensibly humanitarian issue into a pretext for the 
potentially endless extension of the war was the fusing of two distinct 
categories, that of “prisoner of war” (POW) and “missing in action” 
(MIA). A large proportion of those listed as MIA were in fact internally 
categorized by the Pentagon as “killed in action/body not recovered” (KIA/
BNR): that is, such combatants were known to be dead but due to the 
nature of combat conditions their bodies had not been retrieved or were 
not retrievable (1993, 13). While to popular audiences the category “missing 
in action” implied that the fate of each individual was still uncertain and 
so held a range of different possible futures, in fact the Pentagon knew full 
well that many classified as “missing” were dead, and were not and could 
never be prisoners of war. But the list provided by the United States to the 
Vietnamese at the Paris talks in 1969 quite deliberately conflated what had 
until then been quite distinct categories: “We are holding the Communist 
authorities in Southeast Asia responsible for every individual on this list 
whether or not he is internally classified by the services as captured or missing” 
(quoted in Franklin 1993, 68; emphasis added). At a stroke, uncertainty 
was restored to all those categorized as “missing”—even those known to 
be “killed in action/body not recovered”—since all were now potentially 
“captured” or “prisoners of war.” The futures of those known to be dead 
were retroactively reawakened and refigured as open and still negotiable. 
At the same time, this uncertainty erased the historical circumstances 
of each death by delinking it from the nexus of events in which it took 
place. In fusing the categories of POW and MIA, the fact of absence was 
retrospectively recast within a new temporal configuration, becoming a 
perpetual present or eternal moment of possibility suspended between 
life and death. As such, the demand made upon the Vietnamese became 
impossible, since it involved accounting for the ahistorical and uncertain 
futurity of those already dead: the removal of uncertainty would require 
the retrieval of bodies shot down and lost over the sea, abandoned years 
ago in remote jungle, or obliterated by high explosives. The war could 
never be concluded, for how could there ever be “peace” without “honor”?11
If the POW/MIA issue was engineered by the Nixon administration 
and closely calibrated to the extension of the war, it very quickly provided a 
nexus for popular dynamics that would exceed such official organizational 
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direction. The National League of POW/MIA Families was formed 
in May of 1970 (NLPMF 2015a) during the administration’s invasion 
of neutral Cambodia, and was at the outset funded and encouraged by 
figures close to the administration (Allen 2009, 33–40, 57–60; Franklin 
1993, 50–57). It was the League that commissioned the POW/MIA flag, 
with its bowed head in silhouette against barbed wire and a watchtower 
and its legend “You are not forgotten,” which began to circulate widely in 
early 1972 (NLPMF 2015b). But once the prisoners of war were returned 
in Operation Homecoming the following year and discrepancies (deaths 
in captivity and unanticipated returnees) were accounted for by the 
Vietnamese authorities (Allen 2009, 94–95), a core of POW/MIA activists 
refused to accept Pentagon determinations of death for those previously 
listed as MIA (140–54). And they demanded that officials “cease using 
such phrases as ‘all POWs returned’” (97). As one sister of a combatant 
listed as MIA wrote to Nixon, “I still can’t realize that we only got so few 
back. I feel they are holding back more” (quoted in Allen 2009, 97). With 
the unwinding of the project of endless war in Southeast Asia, the public 
relations strategy designed to garner support for it now became a liability, 
fuelling distrust of the very administration that had sought to manage 
popular feelings of hurt and loss.
What retrospectively proved that betrayal was anterior and not 
subsequent was President Ford’s “support for the ‘earned re-entry’ of 
draft evaders and military deserters” (Allen 2009, 138). For the POW/
MIA activists, the refusal to serve was especially significant as it was a 
betrayal of the missing by the nation that had occurred prior to combat 
and the possibility of capture. The draft evaders were therefore intimately 
and irrevocably linked to the fate of the missing, since these were the 
very forces that had already betrayed those left behind even before their loss. 
Their rehabilitation by Ford was then a doubling of betrayal, a repetition 
and retrospective endorsement of an anterior act of treachery. As the 
League’s executive director wrote to the President, it is “inconceivable 
that our Commander-in-Chief would show greater concern . . . for those 
who chose to leave the United States . . . than he does for over 1,300 US 
Servicemen who are still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.” “Our men,” 
the letter insists, “have earned their re-entry whether they be alive and 
walking or in a casket,” unlike the “dodgers and deserters” prioritized by 
the government. Therefore, amnesty should only “have been considered 
[after] (1) the return of all POWs from Southeast Asia, (2) the fullest 
possible accounting of all Missing-in-Action, and, (3) the fullest possible 
repatriation of the remains of all servicemen who died, serving our 
country” (quoted in Allen 2009, 138).
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The uncertainty or openness to futurity accorded to the dead (“whether 
they be alive and walking or in a casket”) fixes one moment in the past 
(the moment of “cho[osing] to leave the United States”) as definitive and 
unable to be atoned for or expurgated. The nation is already marked by 
inauthenticity and treachery in the form of those who left the country to 
avoid the draft, and they must be excluded from the nation indefinitely, 
until all uncertainty is resolved (“the fullest possible accounting,” “the 
fullest possible repatriation”). Thus, the indeterminacy instituted by the 
POW/MIA complex both erases history and fixes the future by instituting 
a temporality of perpetual repetition. Redefined as indeterminate in the 
typographical slash that conjoins POW and MIA, each “killed in action/
body not recovered” death is removed from the events in which it occurred 
and recast as potentially open. Conversely, each case of draft evasion is 
removed from its context of occurrence to be recast as a moment that is 
irredeemable and perpetually the same. The indeterminacy of the POW/
MIA complex requires a process of accounting or empirical verification, 
but this process is itself impossible to conclude and must be repeated 
endlessly, again and again.
Politically, this indeterminacy underpinned both the initial potency 
of the POW/MIA issue for the administration and the movement’s 
subsequent hostility to all attempts by subsequent administrations to 
direct or contain it. Successive administrations (notably under Reagan) and 
various Congressional figures repeatedly sought to harness the persistent 
sense of betrayal articulated by the League, shaping foreign relations 
around the issue, holding official investigations, and according POW/MIA 
iconography privileged legal status.12 Yet for all this official endorsement, 
the result domestically has been to multiply feelings of anger, resentment, 
distrust, and cynicism that hold establishment politics in contempt. As 
Michael J. Allen remarks, in escaping its initial sponsorship by the Nixon 
administration, the POW/MIA complex was transformed into the engine 
of a powerful sense of hostility to establishment politics that has “sparked 
an aggrieved nationalism [which] has yet to abate” (2009, 140).13 But if this 
is an “aggrieved nationalism,” it is one that proves profoundly unsettling 
for the temporal schema of the grand narrative that has become so deeply 
embedded in contemporary theory and for the conception of the nation 
that has been built upon it.
III
Famously, Homi Bhabha rewrites the nation as master narrative by 
describing two incommensurable temporal modes.14 The first is “national 
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time,” the “homogenous, visual time” that is “associated with the nation’s 
imagined community,” the “people” (Bhabha 2004, 205, 206). Such a 
“visualization of time” operates as a “structuring process” or grand narrative. 
In this connection, Bhabha quotes Mikhail Bakhtin’s characterization of 
the dominant narrative temporality in Goethe’s writing: “the necessity of 
the past and the necessity of its place in a line of continuous development 
. . . finally the aspect of the past being linked to the future” (quoted in 
Bhabha 2004, 205). In this necessary narrative sequence, with its rigid 
chain of cause and effect, “national time becomes concrete and visible.” 
But according to Bhabha, the revelation that “the nation’s visual presence 
is the effect of a narrative struggle” enables the emergence of a different 
temporal mode that “interrupts the self-generating time of national 
production and disrupts the signification of the people as homogenous” 
(205, 212). The recognition of “the nation as narration” deconstructs such 
“visual presence,” exposing the violence and suppression inherent in the 
nation’s placid claim to be merely the self-expression of a “homogenous” 
people (204, 212).
This other, deconstructive mode emerges from within “national 
time,” as the moment of disruption inherent in narrative’s inability to be 
self-identical and present to itself (Bhabha 2004, 205). Strictly speaking 
it is not a mode of temporality as such, but is rather the suspension of 
temporal drive and connectivity: it is the “process of iterative ‘unpicking’” 
in which “new forms of identification . . . confuse the continuity of 
historical temporalities, confound the ordering of cultural symbols, [and] 
traumatize tradition” (265, 257). It is “a pulsional incident, the split-second 
movement when the process of the subject’s designation—its fixity—
opens up beside it”; it is a “supplementary space of contingency” that 
“does not require a temporality of continuity or accumulation; it requires 
direction and contingent closure but no teleology and holism.” Thus, 
according to Bhabha, the homogenous time of the master narrative of 
nation is perennially disrupted, opened up, undone, by the “pulsional . . . 
split-second movement” that inheres in its own claim to narrative mastery 
(265). And “this narrative inversion or circulation . . . makes untenable any 
supremacist or nationalist claims to mastery, for the position of narrative 
control is neither monocular nor monologic” (215).
It is, however, difficult to square the projection of the nation implied 
by the affective disposition of POW/MIA with the master narrative of 
“national time.” Bhabha’s framework depends on a “monologic” temporality 
of “narrative control” that is to be deconstructed again and again in a 
“pulsional . . . split-second movement” (215, 265): this temporal disruption 
ruptures the homogeneity of the nation secured through “the continuity 
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of historical temporalities, . . . the ordering of cultural symbols,” and the 
necessity of “tradition” (257). But the affective disposition of POW/MIA 
does not call on the imaginary of the nation narrating itself as full presence.15 
There is no claim to a “narrative control” that is either “monocular” or 
“monologic” (215) because this disposition abjures that there ever was a 
nation that could narrate itself as whole and integral. The betrayal of 
the nation is not subsequent but, as we have seen, anterior, always already 
there—in the antiwar protesters, draft evaders, media commentators, 
establishment politicians, and intellectuals who have already betrayed 
the missing and who are now belatedly (Nachträglich) enabled to narrate 
the “nation” as (and to) themselves. The impossibility of the nation’s 
self-identity—of the nation as the self-expression of a homogenous 
“people”—is consciously thematized, not deconstructively revealed. 
Which is why all accounting for discrepancies, the return of remains, or 
official determinations of death are irrelevant and beside the point. That 
no verifiable evidence of secret captives has ever been produced and no 
plausible rationale for the retention of an elaborate secret prison system by 
impoverished and war-damaged postcolonial states has ever been adduced 
does not in any way hamper the POW/MIA complex. Because there is no 
truth “out there” to be discovered—it is rather a feeling or disposition “in 
here,” half-glimpsed and half-remembered, partial and unverifiable, but 
with that deep undertow of intuition that is more affectively powerful 
than epistemological certainty.
This affective power can be seen in the way that the POW/MIA nexus 
reverses the poles of victim and perpetrator and all but erases the deaths 
of others. It is not possible to know the exact number of deaths resulting 
from the American war in Southeast Asia due to the circumstances in 
which it was fought. But as Nick Turse reports, “the most sophisticated 
analysis yet of wartime mortality in Vietnam, a 2008 study by researchers 
from Harvard Medical School and the Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation at the University of Washington, suggested that a reasonable 
estimate might be 3.8 million violent war deaths, combatant and civilian”—
although “there are good reasons to believe that even this staggering 
figure may be an underestimate” (2013, 13). Deaths resulting from US 
military intervention in Cambodia are estimated at between 600,000 
and 800,000, and those for Laos at 1 million (Tirman 2012). Vietnamese 
government records, although incomplete, indicate that there are still 
300,000 Vietnamese military personal listed as missing (Turse 2013, 12). 
It is estimated that 180,000 people in South Vietnam were arrested under 
the CIA’s Phoenix program, and at its height in 1968 and 1969 about 7,000 
were probably killed (Tirman 2011, 52). Thousands of noncombatants were 
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held in South Vietnam’s Con Son Island prison complex between 1954 and 
1975, and over this period around 20,000 died there, “many of them from 
torture and abuse” (Tucker 2011, 232). Since the war, deaths continue to be 
recorded in all three countries as a result of unexploded munitions, while 
the Vietnamese government claims that 500,000 children have been born 
with birth defects as a result of toxic chemicals used as defoliants (275).
The continuing ubiquity of the POW/MIA flag stands in sharp relief to 
the widespread indifference to these realities (Tirman 2011, 174–75, 337–342). 
Central to the affective disposition of POW/MIA is the construction of 
an injured sensibility that speaks simultaneously as both national hero and 
victim of the nation’s betrayal. This sensibility was extended to cover all 
of the US dead in President Ronald Reagan’s eulogy at the Vietnam War 
Memorial in 1988: “For too long a time, they stood in a chill wind, as 
if in a winter’s night watch. And in that night, their deeds spoke to us, 
but we knew them not. And their voices called to us, but we heard them 
not” (quoted in Tirman 2011, 181). Limning the affective disposition of 
POW/MIA, Reagan’s speech not only erases the histories of US violence 
(now inflicted exclusively upon US combatants) but evaporates alterity so 
as to direct the call for recognition entirely within. This redistribution 
of the poles of perpetrator and victim defines violence within a temporal 
construction of betrayal that is unhomely. Violence is done to a wounded 
and incomplete subjectivity (the “they”) by a people (the “we”) that has 
failed to narrate itself as nation through the medium of “their deeds” and 
heroism (“we knew them not” and “heard them not”). Yet those so betrayed 
cannot be construed as the “real” or “authentic” nation that would strive 
to recall its prior fullness, the lost presence to which its telos seeks return. 
For this wounded, nonidentical subjectivity is always already subject to 
violence, it has always already been betrayed by the nation’s failure to assume 
the “narrative control” that would constitute it as nation (Bhabha 2004, 
215).16 And this is the temporal basis for the intense and violent anger of 
this affective disposition. There is no home, no origin, no nation to be 
recovered, or restored, or returned—for it was never there.
Yet if this affective disposition cannot claim the narrative authority 
of the nation, it is not simply the punctual disruption of “nation time,” 
the opening of a “supplementary space of contingency” that would undo 
the connectivity of historical remembrance and tradition and so “mak[e] 
untenable any supremacist or nationalist claims to mastery” (Bhabha 1993, 
265, 215). For there is a kind of atmospheric meaningfulness or situational 
implication of meaning at work here, a premonition or intuitive feeling that 
enables a mode of analogical association or linking of temporal events that 
is neither master narrative nor pure contingency and dispersal. Rather, it 
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might be traced or adumbrated as the implicit “logic” or directionality of 
its habituated, sedimented intuitions—or what might be termed the little 
stories or petits récits that it tells itself (see MacPhee 2011a, 198–99; 2015, 
252). Such an affective disposition may not be enough to narrate a coherent 
vision of the nation, to establish “the necessity of the past and the necessity 
of its place in a line of continuous development” (quoted in Bhabha 2004, 
205). But it would be well able to sustain reiterations of anger, resentment, 
and violence against targets that need not be understood or identified with 
certainty, but would merely need to be apprehended as signs, or marks, or 
half-glimpsed memories of the always already betrayal of the nation.
IV
Christopher Nolan’s neo-noir Memento (2000) has attracted academic 
interest for its exploration of time and memory, most notably in terms of 
philosophical considerations of moral responsibility in light of its extreme 
qualification of individual agency (see Kania 2009). Productive though 
that focus may be, my consideration of the film here is slightly different. 
I am less concerned with its portrayal of the moral culpability of the 
individual agent per se, and more with the potential for violence it locates 
in banal time after grand narrative.
The film is centered on the disorientating experience of its protagonist 
Leonard Shelby, a former insurance investigator who is driven to seek 
vengeance for an earlier “incident” (Nolan 2001, 176), a home invasion in 
which he believes his wife Catherine was raped and murdered and he was 
left brain damaged. In Leonard’s testimony, while his memory of events 
prior to the assault is intact, the resulting physical injury has caused 
anterograde amnesia, which means he cannot now make new long-term 
memories and can retain short-term memories for only ten to fifteen 
minutes. As he explains to the clerk at his motel, “I know who I am and 
all about myself, but since my injury I can’t make any new memories. 
Everything fades. If we talk for too long, I’ll forget how we started. I 
don’t know if we’ve ever met before and the next time I see you I won’t 
remember this conversation” (114). However, this residual sense of self, 
and the memories of his life prior to the incident he associates with that 
sense of self, provide him with a purpose—revenge. Contrary to the 
official investigation, he believes that a second assailant, a John or James 
G, escaped the crime scene undetected, and he single-mindedly seeks to 
track them down and kill them.
Around this memory of loss and betrayal, Leonard constructs an 
elaborate system to try and sustain his continuity of action, ranging from 
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habits and repeated protocols to a plethora of objects and mementos that 
John Sutton calls “exograms” (2009, 69): prosthetic memory aids that 
include captioned Polaroid photographs, file cards, charts, an annotated 
police report, and most strikingly an array of messages tattooed on his 
body. Leonard is joined at different moments by two characters who claim 
to be helping him in his pursuit of vengeance: a policeman or former 
policeman named John Edward “Teddy” Gammell, and Natalie, a femme 
fatale figure who Leonard comes to feel has undergone a similar loss.
What makes the experience of viewing the film so powerful and its 
interpretation so challenging is the way in which its structure incorporates 
something of Leonard’s temporal dislocation. Memento has a double 
narrative structure, with alternating scenes shot in color and in black and 
white. The episodes filmed in color proceed in reverse order, beginning 
with Leonard’s killing of Teddy—the final event in the story—and 
ending with his earlier killing of the drug dealer Jimmy Grantz, Natalie’s 
boyfriend: each in turn is identified by Leonard as his perpetrator, his John 
or James G. These color scenes also incorporate short memory sequences 
from Leonard’s point of view—flashbacks to the night of the assault and 
fragmentary memories of his wife Catherine. The black and white episodes 
proceed chronologically, and involve Leonard explaining his condition 
over the phone by narrating the story of Sammy Jankis. In Leonard’s 
telling, Sammy Jankis was a case he investigated prior to the incident who 
had a similar memory problem, but which was refused payment because 
Leonard defined it as psychologically rather than physically based. While 
initially difficult to locate in time (Leonard is dressed shabbily and lacks 
the scars we seen in the color episodes), we learn by the end of the film 
that the black and white sequence immediately precedes the events shot 
in color and shown in reverse chronological order. In fact, the story takes 
place over just three days, although the plot or discourse interweaves 
episodes in a temporal loop or “hairpin” that makes the events feel 
temporally distended and the chronology difficult to reconstruct.17 In the 
opening episodes, where the connection between black and white and 
color sequences is yet to coalesce, viewers lack access to the past we need 
to understand situation, action, and character, and like Leonard inhabit a 
present that is disconnected from the prior contexts we might draw on to 
lend it intelligibility. Without the connectivity to prior events we usually 
assume in mainstream narrative cinema, we are left struggling to make 
sense of the situation before us, even though the immediacy of action is 
clear enough.
The film itself offers for consideration two ostensible ways of overcoming 
the dispersal of meaning and the disorientation of subjectivity in time. Or 
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rather, it offers two dimensions of narration that we can recognize as aspects 
of grand narrative. The first is the narrative contiguity and connectivity of 
memory, precisely what the protagonist now lacks. But for Leonard, this 
absence has become liberatory, freeing investigation from the historicizing 
interpretation that retrospectively remodels the facts to conform to its 
unfolding parameters. In reply to Teddy’s warnings about the malleability 
of viewpoint without the scaffolding of memory, Leonard declares:
Memory’s not perfect. It’s not even that good. Ask the police; eyewitness 
testimony is unreliable. The cops don’t catch a killer by sitting around 
remembering stuff. They collect facts, make notes, draw conclusions. 
Facts, not memories: that’s how you investigate. . . . Memory can change 
the shape of a room or the color of a car. It’s an interpretation, not a record. 
Memories can be changed and distorted and they’re irrelevant if you have 
facts. (Nolan 2001, 135)
The problem with memory in this sense is that the very connectivity 
that would provide the conduit to bring the past into the present “as 
it once really was” reshapes that past in terms of the parameters of the 
present. Such a historicizing interpretation renders the past as a necessary 
anticipation of the meaningfulness of the present, and so flattens out the 
very difference of the past that it had hoped to capture. But, of course, 
this first dimension of narrative mastery seems to have been definitively 
ruled out of court by the film because it appears unavailable to Leonard: 
he cannot appeal to the historicizing continuity of memory because of his 
anterograde amnesia. It stands rather as a marker for an alternative mode 
of experiencing temporality that is said to have been lost.
The second approach to ordering meaning in time arises by way of 
Leonard’s appeal to “facts,” which at first sight sounds like a straightforward 
empiricism but which in truth offers something quite different. “There are 
things you can know for sure,” he tells Natalie: “I know the feel of the 
world. . . . I know how this wood will sound when I knock. . . . I know 
how this glass will feel when I pick it up.” But as he continues, he begins 
to describe “knowledge” as the return or restitution of another time, and 
therefore as a “kind of memory”:
Leonard: Certainties. You think its knowledge, but it’s a kind of memory, 
a kind you take for granted. I can remember so much.
(runs hands over objects)
I know the feel of the world . . .
(beat)
. . . and I know her.
Natalie: Your wife?
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Leonard: She’s gone and the present is trivia, which I can scribble down 
in notes. (Nolan 2001, 144)
The second position, which Leonard claims for himself, is not the 
temporally replete empiricism that might be inferred by his language 
of “facts” and “certainties.” As Leonard narrates, without a temporal 
framework of meaningfulness, such a naïve empiricism reduces “the 
present” to “trivia,” a vista of disconnected “facts” to be “scribble[d] down in 
notes.” If it is to escape temporal dispersal and be meaningful, any sensory 
perception must be anchored in a point of origin, a defining ontological 
commitment that subsists prior to the disconnection and dispersal of the 
present. What secures his self-identity as subject and supplies the “facts” 
that confront him with meaning is the originary memory of Catherine 
before the incident, a memory that remains fixed and invulnerable to the 
passing of time and so fixes him: “I know her.” This is not, then, naïve 
empiricism but rather a phenomenological hermeneutic grounded in “a 
kind of memory”—one understood not as continuity in time but as the 
return or restitution of origin. “She’s gone,” Leonard affirms bitterly, but 
his claim to interpretation, to be able to make the “trivia” of the present 
cohere and be meaningful, lies in his ability to recall the memory of his 
wife as origin into the present. Such a restitution of origin provides the 
ontological grounding that would transform the trash of the present—
his Polaroids, scribblings, tattoos, charts, and other exograms—into a 
constellation pregnant with meaning.
Yet if Leonard is denied memory’s element of contiguity and 
linkage, then such a restitution of the past within the present becomes 
problematic. How is the ontological commitment that is kept invulnerable 
in the past to be retrieved and made commensurable within the dispersal 
of temporality? And how is the Leonard from before the “incident,” 
anchored in the ineradicable memory of his dead wife, to be squared 
with the disorientating muddle of sensory signals that constitutes his 
lived experience now? Leonard’s answer is through habit, the repetition 
of protocols, procedures, and performative patterns that allow him 
to continually reestablish a continuity of action and purpose in each 
new now. He takes a Polaroid of his residence, his car, the people he 
encounters, checking them when he wants to drive somewhere or when he 
meets someone, writing short captions on the photographs to prompt his 
response. He follows a pattern of reintroduction and familiarization with 
each new conversation, probing for clues and leads. Valuable information 
is then recorded on scraps of paper or file cards and later assimilated 
within the leaked police report, a dog-eared file that in its increasingly 
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disordered lattice work of annotations, interpolations, and crosshatchings 
has become his research compendium. As Leonard explains on the phone 
to his unseen interlocutor:
I was an investigator. I’d investigate claims to see which were phony. . . . I 
had to see through people’s bullshit. It was useful experience, because now 
it’s my life. When I meet someone, I don’t even know if I’ve met them 
before. I have to look in their eyes and just figure them out. My job taught 
me the best way to find out what someone knows was to let them talk. . . . 
Throw in an occasional “Why?”, but just listen. And watch the eyes, the 
body language. . . . It’s complicated. You might catch a sign but attach the 
wrong meaning to it. If someone touches their nose while they’re talking, 
experts will tell you it means they are lying. It really means they’re nervous, 
and people get nervous for all sorts of reasons. It’s all about context. (Nolan 
2001, 127; emphasis in original)
Most dramatically, once a series of clues and leads coalesce into certainty, 
it is added to the baroque typographical array of details, prompts, 
maxims, and warnings that are tattooed onto Leonard’s body. What is 
inscribed there, according to this hermeneutical procedure, is not simply 
the disparate marks of unconnected moments of lived experience, but a 
constellation of restitution or return, the reconstitution of the memory 
of origin out of the broken shards of temporal dispersal in the present. 
Leonard’s intuition is that as facts are gathered, inscribed, and overlaid, the 
resulting constellation will lead him to the missing John G, the perpetrator 
responsible for robbing him of the past whose loss now authorizes and 
authenticates his quest for vengeance: “He took away the woman I love 
and he took away my memory. He destroyed everything; my life and my 
ability to live. . . . That’s what keeps me going. It’s all I have” (135).
Except that it is not quite so easy as all that. How is it that Leonard can 
develop protocols and procedures that relate only to his condition after 
the incident, such as training himself to check his pockets in sequence 
for his Polaroids? How is it that he recognizes his tattoos (or indeed 
his other exograms) as clues that relate to his search for John G, rather 
than as bizarre mutilations or signs of torture (or random messages from 
an unknown deceiver)? And how is it that Leonard even knows he has a 
“condition” and is able to rehearse a potted account of it for every person 
that he encounters? In each case, these would appear to involve some 
element of the long-term or persistent memory of situations or behaviors 
that occurred after he suffered his anterograde amnesia, the condition that 
is supposed to make the formation of such persistent memories impossible. 
And doesn’t the development of new protocols, routines, and patterns of 
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behavior involve a kind of temporal continuity and contiguity? Indeed, 
Leonard himself describes learning by repetition as a way of “physically . . . 
making new memories” (Nolan 2001, 179). In which case, these continuities 
would be open to the very objections that he explained to Teddy in his 
rejection of the historicizing interpretation of memory: that “memory can 
change the shape of a room or the color of a car,” that “it’s an interpretation, 
not a record,” and that “memories can be changed and distorted” (Nolan 
2001, 135). But then how can he be sure that the memory of origin—that 
is supposed to be inviolable and unchanging, and which is to give his life 
purpose and events meaning—is the past as it really was, and not something 
conditioned or learned by repetition, routine, and habit?
Leonard seeks to ward off such questions through the story of Sammy 
Jankis and the distinction he draws in its telling between the “physical” 
and the “psychological” basis of what appears to be the same disorder 
(Nolan 2001, 141). According to this distinction, Sammy’s inability to 
respond to “conditioning” or “learning by repetition” (136) showed that 
the cause of his disorder was psychological, a function of the work of 
memory proper. In contrast, Leonard defines his own ability to generate 
new procedures and protocols of behavior as a function of physical modes 
of conditioning or training through repetition—modes that he claims 
function “not by memory” understood as a psychological capacity “but by 
instinct,” understood as a strictly physical dynamic (137). “Conditioning 
didn’t work for Sammy, so he became helpless,” he recounts to his phone 
caller; “But it works for me. I live the way Sammy couldn’t. Habit and 
routine makes my life possible. Conditioning. Acting on instinct” (141). 
However, this distinction proves fatal for Sammy’s diabetic wife. Taking 
his condition to be “psychological” and therefore reversible, she attempts 
to jumpstart Sammy’s memory by asking him repeatedly to administer 
her insulin injection in the hope that the mortal danger of an overdose 
will force a recrudescence of temporal connectivity. Her wager is lost 
as Sammy’s memory stubbornly refuses to cohere and he unwittingly 
administers the fatal dose.
However, Memento adroitly and subtly scuppers Leonard’s attempted 
solution. Not only does the film collapse the distinction he wants to 
make between memory proper (as psychological) and what he defines 
as the physical modes of “habit,” “routine,” “conditioning,” and “acting 
on instinct” (141), but more tellingly it drains away any possibility of 
memory’s restitution of origin. In the pivot scene that comes at the end 
of the discourse (but midway in the story), Teddy tells Leonard that his 
wife Catherine survived the incident (218), that she was diabetic, and 
that “Sammy didn’t have a wife” (219). So the backstory constructed so 
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painstakingly both by Leonard and the viewer disintegrates. Of course, 
Teddy may be lying, as we have seen him verifiably lie moments before: 
he pretends not to know Leonard and calls himself a cop while in the 
chronologically prior scene he had claimed to be an informer and subject to 
the manipulation of a local police officer (216, 207). Regardless, this doubt 
forces us to scrutinize the links we have made or imagined in order to 
decipher the plot and make the film meaningful, revealing the uncertainty 
already apparent in Leonard’s memory of Catherine. At various moments 
through the discourse, we have witnessed in lightning-quick flashbacks 
Leonard’s own hand both injecting his wife and alternatively pinching her 
thigh; we have seen him remember her blinking after the apparently fatal 
assault; and most troublingly, he remembers an image of them together in 
bed when he is tattooed with a declaration of the death of John G, a tattoo 
that appears nowhere else in the story world of the film.
In returning to his remembrances of Catherine, we realize that 
his memories of her before the incident are not intact, inviolable, or 
unchanging. And whatever weight we are to give to Teddy’s unsettling 
claims, it is clear that Leonard’s memories of his wife, that are to structure 
his revenge and give meaning to the disconnection of lived experience, 
are far from providing the point of origin or full presence which would 
anchor his phenomenological hermeneutic. Although Leonard imputes an 
idealized status to his wife and their marriage, as Andrew Kania observes, 
“the images that accompany his recollections belie these descriptions.” 
The footage we see of her is spare and repetitive, and when Natalie 
invites him to “close your eyes, remember her,” the weave of memory 
is hazy, indeterminate, and threadbare. Kania remarks that “Catherine 
is almost never depicted smiling; rather she seems sad, or even lost—
much like Sammy’s wife after his accident.” It is possible, he notes, “that 
these memories are from after the incident, when Catherine was having 
trouble dealing with Leonard’s condition” (2009, 171). Notably, Leonard’s 
discursive account of the texture of his memories of her and their life 
together skirts emotional contact, psychological insight, and empathetic 
understanding, claiming only the barest minimum:
You can only feel details. Bits and pieces which you didn’t bother to put 
into words. And extreme moments you feel even if you don’t want to. Put 
it together and you get the feel of the person, enough to know how much 
you miss them, and how much you hate the person who took them away. 
(Nolan 2001, 125)
Despite Leonard’s claim that recollection can return “the feel of the 
person,” this is not the restitution of origin, of the wholeness of the past as 
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the ground that would anchor and make meaningful the dereliction and 
dispersal of the present. Rather, it resembles more closely the habituated 
memory or intuition (“I know how this glass will feel when I pick it up”) 
that he tells us “makes my life possible” (144, 141). And in the scenes where 
Leonard hires an escort to reenact his awakening without his wife on 
the night of the assault, we witness his conditioning of his own habitual 
memory—not to recapture the warmth or closeness of their relationship 
but to reinforce or reimagine the incident as the temporal marker of 
Catherine’s loss. The memory that is so affectively tenacious is not the 
restitution of origin in its fullness and self-presence, but the retention 
through conditioning and repetition of the “feeling” of absence and the 
anger at the half-memory of betrayal: “enough to know how much you 
miss them, and how much you hate the person who took them away” (125).
V
If action and decision cannot be orientated within a grand narrative anchored 
in the restitution of origin, Memento suggests that they may nonetheless be 
determined and configured in the banal time of conditioning, repetition, 
habit, feeling, and intuition. Or in the language used earlier in this essay, in 
the affective disposition engendered by a hazy but bitterly felt sense of the 
loss of a narrative mastery that was never there.
Leonard is not, at least in this respect, like Sammy Jankis, cut adrift in 
a perpetual present without continuity or connectivity and so “helpless” 
(Nolan 2001, 141)—unable to decide or act under his own direction. 
Leonard does make fateful decisions: in crossing out the warning on Natalie’s 
photograph and writing in his intuition of her empathy; in deciding to 
annotate Teddy’s picture with “DON’T BELIEVE HIS LIES”; in burning 
the Polaroids of Jimmy’s corpse and of himself after killing an earlier John 
G; in tearing up the file card recording “TATTOO: I’VE DONE IT”; and 
most irrevocably, in writing Teddy’s car license number on a file card under 
the legend “TATTOO: FACT 6.” “I am not a killer,” Leonard tells himself 
while still retaining the short-term memory of killing Jimmy Grantz, “but 
right now I need to be” (223). In the unfolding of events we have already 
witnessed, we know that these decisions will lead to the identification of 
Teddy—John Edward Gammell—as the next John G, the next (and latest) 
object of Leonard’s justified anger and violent revenge. And in the moment 
of decision, so does Leonard.
How are we to understand the temporal genesis of such decisions? What 
contexts of deliberation and judgment are operative if Leonard’s decision is 
not organized by an originary grand narrative, as the inviolable return of the 
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self who had loved Catherine? For the Leonard who makes these decisions 
is not that person; and yet he is not “helpless” like Sammy Jankis, deprived 
of continuity and so agentless. As we have seen, decision does not take place 
as an indeterminate “pulsional . . . split-second movement” (Bhabha 2004, 
265), but emerges within the sedimented intuitions that accumulate through 
the practices and protocols of repetition, conditioning, and habit exhibited 
time and again through the film. In which case, decision is conditioned by 
the implicit “logic” or directionality of Leonard’s habituated intuitions, by 
what we have called his affective disposition. As Teddy smirks: “Like you’ve 
told yourself. Over and over. Conditioning yourself to believe. ‘Learning 
through repetition’” (Nolan 2001, 218). But although Leonard’s decision is 
conditioned by the past, it cannot recognize its own happening as conditioning, 
habit, and routine, its own process as the patterning and orientation of 
intuition. And because it cannot acknowledge the past of its determination, 
it cannot evaluate the outcomes of this determination. As Hannah 
Arendt notes, “relentless activity allows responsibility to evaporate”: for 
responsibility “can only develop in the moment when a person reflects—
not on himself, but on what he’s doing” (2013, 59–60; emphasis added). 
In Arendt’s sense, Leonard is an image of “functioning” (44).18 As she 
explains in an interview with Joachim Fest, “functioning” is a response to 
the atomization and decay of social texture in modernity, which produces 
the feeling of being “powerless, however strong you may be.” Functioning 
offers the “feeling of power that arises from acting together” (43) while 
simultaneously “eliminate[ing]” all the “discussing things together, reaching 
certain decisions, accepting responsibility, thinking about what we are 
doing” that is involved in acting together in the political sense (44). In the 
moment of his killing of Teddy which opens the film, Leonard will once 
again be unburdened by the memory of his own prior acts, repetitions, and 
decisions. And so he will be able to dispatch the perpetrator, whose guilt is 
known intuitively, with the innocent ruthlessness of the wronged victim as 
if for the first time—jamais vu.19
Leonard’s ability to make decisions suggests a more complex conception 
of temporality than contemporary theory’s abstract opposition of the 
necessary temporal continuity of grand narrative and the liberatory 
temporal dispersal of its disruption. His decisions are not the free and 
spontaneous productions of the self-identical subject of master narrative, 
but nor are they the irruption of contingency and indeterminacy that 
contemporary theory has imagined as its other. Absent the determining 
connectivity of events promised by historicism and the overarching 
restitution of origin recalled by a phenomenology of authenticity, there 
is nonetheless a kind of temporal connectivity here that escapes the 
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blanket denunciation of continuity and memory in grand narrative: in the 
retention of past operations and iterations and the accretion of an affective 
habitus or disposition over time—“call it muscle memory, whatever,” 
suggests Leonard offhandedly at one point (Nolan 2001, 136). And while 
it offers neither epistemological certainty nor ontological grounding, such 
an affective disposition is not without a kind of meaningfulness, albeit 
one that cycles willy-nilly through anger, empathy, innocence, and guilt. 
As Leonard confides on the phone to his unseen confessor: “with my 
condition, you don’t know anything . . . you feel angry, guilty, you don’t 
know why. You could do something terrible and not have the faintest idea 
ten minutes later” (200).
The banal time of Memento’s ruthlessly innocent violence may shed 
some light on the perplexing concision of Hannah Arendt’s discussion of 
the “banality of evil” in the postscript to her Eichmann in Jerusalem. There 
she writes that,
Eichmann was not Iago and not Macbeth, and nothing would have been 
farther from his mind than to determine with Richard III “to prove 
a villain.” Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his 
personal advancement, he had no motives at all. . . . He merely, to put the 
matter colloquially, never realized what he was doing. (Arendt 1965, 287)
It might reasonably be objected that in this formulation Arendt reduces 
perpetrators like Eichmann to automatons or cyphers defined only by a 
“lack of imagination” (287), denying them their all too human motivations, 
foibles, nuances, and agency by perversely contrasting them to literary 
figures whose complexity of character and psychological depth has been 
the subject of scholarly debate for generations. Or as Ronit Lentin presents 
this objection elsewhere in this special issue, Arendt’s “banality thesis 
negates the possibility that perpetrators of atrocities . . . are complex 
human beings, performing intentional acts, rather than demonic or banal 
creatures” (246). But in light of the banal time of Memento traced here, such 
a reading can be seen to restrict banality within the abstract opposition of 
master narrative and temporal disruption, as the other pole—emotionless, 
absent of meaningfulness, and deprived of decision and agency—to the 
master narrative of the “demonic”—where all complexity, guilt, and 
innocence would be said to reside. But as Memento suggests, banal time 
is not the other of grand narrative, not its lack or absence or disruption 
or deconstruction. And Leonard is not without suffering, complexity, 
innocence, or guilt. As Teddy says to him in one of the film’s most 
powerfully ironic moments, “You’re not a killer, Lenny. That’s why you 
are so good at it” (Nolan 2001, 223).
CLT 43.1 2nd proof text.indd   42 12/21/2015   12:10:31 PM
Graham MacPhee | ESSAYS 43
NOTES
1  This is in contrast to the current protests about flying the Confederate battle flag 
on public buildings. While one flag is currently overshadowed by the controversy 
over the other, the one’s visibility and the other’s invisibility are linked by their 
shared syntax of display: as public markers of affective dispositions whose 
signifying power lies in the public claim that they are denied publicity.
2  Among other items, Amazon currently lists for sale a “POW/MIA Not 
Forgotten” one-piece infant bodysuit in sizing for 6, 12, 18, and 24 months and 
with color options in white, light blue, and light pink.
3  See Franklin (2001, 48). A similar point is made also using Schell’s observation 
by Tran (2010, 276) and Perlstein (2014, 13).
4  For Fredric Jameson, this absolute loss of meaning and identity was to define 
the very condition of post-Vietnam America, which he was to generalize 
aesthetically as “postmodernity”: “the breakdown of temporality suddenly 
releases this present of time. . . . thereby isolated, that present suddenly engulfs 
the subject with undescribable vividness, a materiality of perception properly 
overwhelming, which effectively dramatizes the power of the material . . . 
signifier in isolation” (1991, 27). For a critique of Jameson’s aesthetic conception 
of politics see MacPhee (2002, 87–95).
5  For a fuller account of the theoretical assumptions built into the abstract 
opposition of grand narrative and temporal disruption see MacPhee (2011a).
6  An early and influential statement of the current orthodoxy is provided by 
Derek Attridge and Geoff Bennington’s collection Post-Structuralism and the 
Question of History. As they write in their introduction, post-structuralism is to be 
conceived as an absolutized “resistance to totalization and synthesis” (1987, 9). As 
Bennington makes clear in his contribution to the volume, what is being resisted 
is “the Left” (18). For a more nuanced vision of the relationship between Derrida’s 
thinking and the Left Hegelian tradition, see Beardsworth (1996, 46–97).
7  The official title of what became known as The Pentagon Papers is the Report of 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force (1969). The entire report is 
available online at www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers. The excerpts 
printed in the New York Times in 1971 were published in book form by Bantam 
as The Pentagon Papers that same year. For a more current illustration of the 
recurrence of these conditions of apperception in the decision-making of 
the political and military bureaucracy, see Ben Kiernan and Taylor Owen’s 
comparison of the US bombing of Cambodia and of Afghanistan (2010).
8  Which is not to say that Ellsberg did not care for the civilian and noncombatant 
casualties inflicted by the US in Southeast Asia, as he makes clear for example 
in “Murder in Laos” (see especially 1972, 270–71). In his memoir Secrets, 
Ellsberg notes that, “ironically, the realities from which we were drawing 
our conclusions were known to most people in the world. They were hidden 
only from those who believed the public lies of the US government” (2002, 
281). This situation was recently repeated most strikingly in the run up to US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.
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9  Ellsberg records that “no other volumes of the papers . . . had so great an 
impact on my perspective toward the war” (2002, 274). However, this shift in 
his perspective also needs to be set alongside his personal experience of the 
activism of a generation of draft resisters (see 271–72). He writes, “for me as 
an American to read, in our own official secret documents, about the origins 
of the conflict and of our participation in it was to see our involvement—and 
the killing we had done and were still doing—naked of any shred of legitimacy 
from the beginning. That strengthened and extended backwards in time the 
conclusion I had drawn in May, in Ohio; the immorality of our deliberately 
prolonging the killing by a single additional day, or bomb, or death” (256).
10 The editors of Postcolonial Studies and Beyond argue that that in order to address the 
global inequalities of power and resources, we may “need to keep alive particular 
metanarratives” and the collective subjectivities they sustain (Loomba et al. 2005, 
34). For an earlier statement of the problematic nature of Bhabha’s nomination of 
“the indeterminate” as the “basis” for “freedom,” see MacPhee (1996).
11 Richard Milhous Nixon ran in the 1968 presidential election promising to 
achieve an “honorable end to the war,” which later became the slogan “peace 
with honor” (McMahon and Zeiler 2012, 628). Nixon asked rhetorically “Can 
the President of the United States sitting in the office with responsibility for 
four hundred POWs . . . withdraw all of our forces as long as the enemy holds 
one American as a prisoner of war” (Schell 1975, 76). As Ellsberg recounts, 
“What lay ahead, as I saw it: an endless, expanding war” (2002, 347).
12 The POW/MIA issue delayed the restoration of diplomatic and economic 
relations between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam until 
1995. As H. Bruce Franklin notes, this delay allowed the United States to avoid 
providing the reconstruction aid that the Nixon administration had promised 
in the Paris Peace Agreement, so crippling the economic development of the 
impoverished country (1993, 122–23). As Franklin notes in the 1992 election, 
“no national candidate ever made an issue of America’s ongoing economic and 
political war against Vietnam” (192–93).
The National League of Families POW/MIA flag is legally designated as 
“the symbol of our nation’s concern and commitment to resolving as fully as 
possible the fates of Americans still prisoner, missing, and unaccounted for in 
Southeast Asia” according to the United States Legal Code, and is required to 
be flown over specified government building on certain days each year; see 36 
U. S. C., § 902 (2002).
13 The POW/MIA issue was an important driver for Ross Perot’s third party 
presidential challenge in 1992 (Franklin 1993, 188–89). The movement also had 
a significant impact in damaging the presidential election bids of Senator John 
McCain and, in concert with the Swift boat veterans group, Senator John Kerry 
(Allen 2009, 292–301).
14 I develop this reading of Homi Bhabha’s position in more detail in MacPhee 
2011b, 100–106.
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15 Jonathan Tran describes the POW/MIA movement as offering “not only a 
myth but a counter-myth that fissures every claim of totality by questioning 
the greatness of a nation that would forget for convenience” (2010, 279).
16 As Michael J. Allen writes, “caught in the middle of a war without end, 
[the prisoners of war] and their families became stand-ins for millions of 
Americans who had lost faith in the war but were unable to escape it” (2009, 
61). An anticipation of this configuration of temporality is provided by Walter 
Benjamin in an essay written in 1930, “Theories of German Fascism.” Here he 
introduces the concept of the “postwar war” (Nachkrieg): “the victor retains the 
war, the vanquished misplaces it. . . . The victor annexes the war for himself, 
makes it his own property; the vanquished no longer possesses it and must live 
without it” (1999, 315). For a reading of the temporality of the “postwar war,” see 
MacPhee (2000).
17 For a diagrammatic representation of the sequence of scenes, see Kania 2009, 
3–4; and Klein 2001.
18 This account of banal time is the corollary of the reading of Arendt’s conception 
of banality that I develop in the introduction to this special issue: see especially 
8–13 above. In Arendt’s view, “the pleasure in this mere functioning . . . was 
quite evident in Eichmann” (2013, 44). “He wanted to go along with the rest, 
. . . he wanted to say ‘we,’” she observes, “and going-along-with-the-rest and 
wanting-to-say-we like this were quite enough to make the greatest of all 
crimes possible” (43).
19 Alan S. Brown explains that, “whereas déjà vu involves an experience of 
inappropriate familiarity, one can also experience the opposite illusion of 
recognition: inappropriate unfamiliarity, or jamais vu. More specifically, 
a jamais vu experience involves an objectively familiar situation that feels 
unfamiliar, such as walking into your bedroom and momentarily having no 
sense of familiarity associated with the setting. Whereas the translation of déjà 
vu means ‘already seen,’ jamais vu means ‘never seen’” (2004, 103).
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